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RECOGNIZING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
OF MEDIA ACCESS TO EVIDENTIARY 
RECORDINGS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
As a result of the broadcast media's expanding news coverage of 
criminal trials, 1 journalists increasingly seek access to audio or video 
recordings that have been introduced into evidence at trial. 2 Such eviden-
tiary recordings are well suited to the distinctive needs and characteristics 
of the broadcast media. 3 But the same features of the recordings that 
attract the interest of broadcast media likewise pose the danger of prej-
udicial pretrial publicity, which undermines a defendant's right to a 
fair trial. 4 
The Supreme Court has not yet recognized that the news media's 
access to evidentiary recordings is protected by the Constitution. s Con-
sequently, the legal bases of the media's access are uncertain, and courts 
1. Traditionally broadcast media were not interested in covering judicial proceedings. See 
Wilson, Justice in Living Color: The Case for Courtroom Television, 60 A.B.A. J. 294, 294 (1974). 
The traditional lack of interest resulted from the numerous restrictions placed on the means 
of covering judicial proceedings. See Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited 
or a Mode.st Proposal for the Constitutional Protection of the News-gathering Process, 1980 
Dma; L.J. 641, 663. American Bar Association Canons and the Estes v. Texas decision, 381 
U.S. S32 (196S), were widely believed to prevent camera or broadcast coverage of trials. See 
D'Alemberte, Cameras in the Courtroom, LmoATION, Fall 1982, at 20. For many years some 
courts also prohibited sketch artists. See United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 497 
F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1974). Even with the use of artists' sketches, coverage seemed so stilted 
that broadcasters frequently decided not to cover judicial proceedings at all. See Spann, Cameras 
in the Courtroom - for Better or for Worse, 64 A.B.A. J. 797, 797 (1978). 
2. The tenn "recordings" includes both audio and video recordings. The term "evidentiary 
recordings" denotes recordings that have been admitted into evidence at criminal trials. 
3. The broadcast media generally attempt to communicate news dramatically. It must attract 
the attention of an audience that may simultaneously be engaged in -other activities and thus 
it emphasizes the representation of events rather than the narration of a description. See Lichty, 
Video versus Print, WILSON Q .• Special Issue 1982, at 49, S2-S3. See generally I. FAN0, TELEVI• 
SION NEWS, RADIO NEWS 184, 186 (1980); E. EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE 19S-96, 263 {1973); 
Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 662. 
4. The deleterious effect of prejudicial publicity on a defendant's right to a fair trial has 
been a perennial problem. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. S39, S47 (1976); Irvin 
·V. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 {1961). See generally REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE ON THE OPERATION 
OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS - FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE, 4S F.R.D. 391, 394-95 {1968); 
Ares, Chandler v. Florida: Television, Fair Trial and Due Process, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 1S7, 
164; Douglass, Media Technology, Fair Trial, and the Citizen's Right to Know, 54 N.Y. ST. 
B.J. 364, 36S-66 (1982); Stephenson, Fair Trial-Free Press: Rights in Conflict, 46 BROOKLYN 
L. REv. 39, 40 (1979). 
S. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. One trial court has recognized that the public 
has a first amendment right of access to court records, including evidentiary recordings. United 
States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292 {E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 689 F.2d 21 {2d Cir. 1982). 
121 
122 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:1 
may deny the media access without properly analyzing the conflicting 
rights and interests present in particular cases. 6 As a result, courts may 
deny the broadcast media access to evidentiary recordings even when 
such access does not conflict with the rights of a defendant. 7 
This Note advocates recognition of a constitutional right of press 
access to evidentiary recordings in criminal trials. It proposes methods 
for accommodating the competing rights of the news media to have 
access to evidentiary recordings used in criminal trials and the right 
of criminal defendants to a fair trial. Part I examines the source of 
controversy and sets forth the limitations inherent in the current com-
mon law presumption of press access to judicial records. Part II dis<!usses 
the underlying values that require recognition of the constitutional right 
and suggests that such a right can be accommodated with a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial. 
I. THE CoNTROVERSY OVER PRESS ACCESS 
To EVIDENTIARY PROCEEDINGS 
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 8 the Supreme Court con-
fronted suddenly, for the first time, and without benefit of extensive 
prior state or federal litigation, the question of whether the broadcast 
media should be granted access to evidentiary recordings. 9 In this case, 
news broadcasters seeking access to the Watergate tapes asserted that 
the first and sixth amendments supported their right to copy and broad-
cast the tapes. 10 Although the Court found unique statutory grounds 
6. See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 34-37 & 70 and accompanying text. 
8. 43S U.S. S89 (1978). 
9. The Court acknowledged that the scope of the media access was a rarely litigated issue. 
Id. at S97. Despite the absence of prior litigation, the issue of access is significant. There may 
be many more instances than are suggested by the reported case law. A grant or denial of access 
is merely one of many orders issued by a trial judge and, unless appealed, is unlikely to be 
reported. Historically, broadcasters have not aggressively asserted their first amendment rights. 
See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation 
of the Mass media, 1S MICH. L. R.Ev. I, 17 (1976). Because of the time pressures the broadcast 
media face, they are unlikely to appeal a denial of access. See I. FANG, supra note 3, at 171. 
By the time an order reversing the denial of access can be obtained, the material sought will 
often no longer have any news value. Consequently, prudent use of resources would lead the 
news media to contest denials of access to evidentiary recordings only in especially significant cases. 
This inhibition of the exercise of first amendment rights that inevitably results from any form 
of prior restraint or restriction on the newsgathering process has been frequently recognized and 
deplored. See generally Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 4T/ U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976); New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Fahringer, Charting 
a Course From the Free Press to a Fair Trial, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. S-9 (1978); Landau, 
Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, 62 A.B.A. J. SS, S9-60 (1976). But see 
Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 Mnm. L. REv. 11, 64-66 
(1981) (expressing skepticism that a few days delay in reporting on judicial proceeding, is devastating 
to the news value of such reports). 
10. 435 U.S. at 608-10. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text. 
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for its decision denying access, 11 it stated that the first and sixth amend-
ments did not require a different result. 12 
Even before the Supreme Court's rejection of a constitutional right 
of news media access to evidentiary recordings, persons seeking the 
release of such recordings resorted to a common law presumption in 
favor of access to judicial and other official records 13 that "predates 
the Constitution itself."" After the Court's refusal to recognize a con-
stitutional right of access, the common law presumption remains the 
only effective means for third parties to obtain access to evidence used 
in trials. 
A. Presumption of Access to Judicial Records at Common Law 
American courts traditionally have allowed nonlitigants access to 
judicial records without requiring any showing of special need or 
interest. 15 Nevertheless, if a request for access is motivated by private 
spite, a desire to promote public scandal, or other improper motive, 
courts have discretion to deny access. 16 
Access to official records includes both the inspection and copying 
of the record.'7 Although the common law presumption that access 
11. Although neither of the parties thought it was applicable, the Court relied on the Presidential 
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, Title I, §§ 101-106, 44 U.S.C. 
§ 2107 note (1976). The Court interpreted the Act as providing that the legislative and executive 
branches control public access to presidential records; consequently, it concluded that release 
of the tapes by courts would be improper. 43S U.S. at 603-06. 
12. 435 U.S. at 608. 
13. It is well established that public records include judicial records. See, e.g., Nixon, 435 
U.S. at 597; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 89S-99 (E.D. 
Pa. 1981). See generally H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIOHT TO KNow 136 (19S3). · 
14. United States v. Mitchell, S51 F.2d 12S2, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (footnote omitted), rev'd 
on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. S89 (1978). 
15. At common law, English courts required a nonlitigant seeking access to court records 
to demonstrate a property interest in the document or to show a need for the document as evidence 
in another lawsuit. American courts have rarely followed the limitations on access adopted by 
the English courts. Rather, American courts have tended to allow all citizens access to court 
records. See N°1Jton v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. S89, 597-98 (1978). See generally 
Note, Copying and Broadcasting Video and Audio Tape Evidence: A Threat to the Fair Trial 
Right, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. S51, S57-S8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Copying and Broad-
casting]; Note, The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In Camera or 
On Cameras, 16 GA. L. REv. 659, 660 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Common Law Right); 
Comment, All Courts Should Be Open: The Public's Right to View Judicial Proceedings and 
Records, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 311, 337-39 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, All Courts Should 
Be Open). 
16. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 43S U.S. S89, 598 (1978); City of 
St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., S19 S.W.2d 811, 81S (Ky. 1974). See generally 
Comment, All Courts Should Be Open, supra note IS, at 343-44. 
17. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 43S U.S. S89, S97 {1978); United States 
v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 600, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States 
v. Myers (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 63S F.2d 94S, 949 (2d Cir. 1980); Ortiz v. Jaramillo, 
82 N.M. 44S, 446, 483 P.2d S00, S01 (1971); H. Caoss, supra note 13, at 34. See generally 66 
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includes the right to copy stems from a time when all records were 
documentary, courts universally have assumed that the presumption 
applies equally to nondocumentary records.18 
American courts have allowed public access to official records because 
they have considered such access to be fundamental to democratic 
society. 19 Access promotes values· underlying the first amendment by 
ensuring an "informed and enlightened public opinion" regarding mat-
ters documented by the records. 20 Access also promotes values underly-
ing the sixth amendment by " '[safeguarding] against any attempt to 
employ our courts as instruments of persecution,' . . . [promoting] 
the search for truth, and ... [assuring] 'confidence in ... judicial 
remedies.' " 21 
Despite the importance placed on the common law presumption of 
public access to official records, the courts have not delineated clearly 
the scope of public access. The Supreme Court has found it "difficult 
to distill from the relatively few judicial decisions a comprehensive 
definition of [the presumption in favor of access] . . . or to identify 
all the factors to be weighed in determining whether access is 
appropriate. " 22 The Court has declined to define the limits of the 
presumption and has left the scope of access to be determined by trial 
courts ''in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the par-
AM. JuR. 2D Records and Recording Laws § 13 (1973) (without the right to copy, the right to 
inspect is "practically valueless"). But see Guarriello v. Benson, 90 N.J. Super. 233, 240, 217 
A.2d 22, 26-27 (1966) (request to copy audio recordings of public municipal hearing denied when 
any resident could listen to tapes and get copy of stenographic transcription). 
18. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); see also Ortiz 
v. Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 445, 446-47, 483 P.2d 500, 501-02 (1971). 
The judicial extension of the right to copy public documents to include nondocumentary public 
records was not required by the original considerations supporting a right to copy. In the past, 
most records were documentary, so coextensive rights to copy and inspect conferred little more 
than the opportunity to obtain the essential discursive information contained by the documents. 
More sophisticated methods of copying documents, e.g., photocopying, were accepted without 
question because they merely provided a more efficient method for duplicating the discursive 
content of documentary records. 
In contrast, a right to copy nondocumentary material ensures not only that the discursive con-
tent of the public record can be recorded, but it also permits dissemination of the nondiscursive 
content of the records, such as intonation, pauses, and body language. 
Although access might have been denied on the basis that the presumption in favor of access 
extended only to the type of information contained in documentary records, it is now established 
that the presumption of access extends to nondocumentary public records and that such access 
includes the right to copy. United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 
609, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
19. Cf. Note, Common Law Right, supra note 15, a_t 666 (sound public policy requires access 
because every individual is presumed to know the law). 
20. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
21. Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 237, 270 & n.24 (1948)). 
22. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1978). 
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ticular case. m 3 Judicial controversy has erupted as courts have attempted 
to define more precisely the strength of the presumption in favor of 
access in the context of evidentiary recordings. 
Several courts have acknowledged the absence of a specific constitu-
tional right of access to evidentiary recordings but have emphasized 
nonetheless the close connection between the common law presump-
tion of access and freedoms that are constitutionally protected by the 
first and sixth amendments. 24 Due to their common heritage, both the 
presumption of access and the sixth amendment are said to promote 
a "community catharsis" and to satisfy public ·desire for justice. 25 
Moreover, access to judicial records enhances the public observation 
and understanding of the criminal justice process, 26 thus increasing the 
benefits resulting from the constitutional protection of the right to a 
public trial and the right to free expression of ideas. 21 
Courts have recognized that the practical limitations on the public's 
opportunity to attend trial proceedings28 and the ease with which replica-
tion and broadcast can be accomplished are also important factors in 
support of the presumption of access. 29 One court has held that after 
recordings have been played in court, only the "most extraordinary cir-
cumstances" justify restrictions on the opportunity of persons who were 
not present to see or hear the recordings. 30 
In balancing the defendant's fair trial rights with the presumption 
of access, courts recognizing a strong presumption of access have 
minimized the potential adverse effect on a defendant's right to a fair 
trial._ These courts have hel~ that access should be denied only when 
23. Id. 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.}, 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Mouzin, 559 F. Supp. 463, 466 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Other courts have recognized 
a "strong" presumption in favor of public access to judicial records, including evidentiary record-
ings. They have held that the presumption is not rebutted by possible prejudice to a defendant's 
fair trial rights that is highly speculative. See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 540 F. Supp. 
769 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
25. United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 
1981); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
26. See United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d 
Cir. 1981). 
27. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
28. See United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609, 614 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers (In,,.re National Broadcasting Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
29. See United States v. Myers (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
30. Id.; see also United States v. Pageau, 535 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); United States 
v. Dean, 527 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ga. 1981); In re Griffin Television, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
1947 (W.D. Okla. 1981); United States v. Reiter, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1927 (D. Md. 1981). 
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"actual, as opposed to hypothetical, factors demonstrate that justice 
so requires. " 31 For these courts the mere possibility that jurors would 
be prejudiced as a result of broader dissemination of evidence already 
held admissible poses no significant risk to a fair trial. 32 When there 
is only a small likelihood of a second trial or a trial on a related issue, 
courts advocating a strong presumption in favor of public access to 
records conclude that "the interest in avoiding the risk of potential 
prejudice ... is seldom of sufficient weight to justify denying access. " 33 
In contrast, other courts give less weight to the presumption of ac-
cess. Because access is not a constitutional right, these courts conclude 
that it is counterbalanced by even a slight threat to a constitutional 
right. 34 For these courts, the right of access is "undeniably important" 
but does not merit the same degree of judicial protection as the freedom 
of the press guarantee. 35 It is ''merely one of the interests to be weighed 
on the broadcasters' 'side of the scales.• m 6 
Because the presumption of access is not specifically protected by 
the Constitution, the courts that differentiate the presumption 'rrom 
underlying interests served by the first amendment conclude that ef-
fects of access on a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial should 
be given much greater weight than any improvement of public 
understanding that might result from permitting access. 37 Consequently 
the effect on the freedom of the press interests is minimized; courts 
find the interest of the press satisfied by providing transcripts and per-
mitting the broadcast press to view and hear the evidentiary recording. 38 
B. Limitations of the Common Law Presumption 
of Access- to Court Records 
Courts adopting a strong presumption in favor of news media ac-
31. United States v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.), 672 F2d 1289, 1290 (7th Cir. 1982); 
see also United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609, 618 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d 
Cir. 1981); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
32. See United States v. Edwards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.), 672 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 
1982); United States v. Myers (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980). 
33. United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609, 618 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
34. See, e.g., Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981); United States 
v. Bolen, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
35. See Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1981). 
36. Id. at 434 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 43S U.S. S89, 602 (1978)) 
(emphasis in original). 
37. See, e.g., id. at 431 ("It is better to err, if err we must, on the side of generosity in 
the protection of a defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury."). 
38. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,609 (1978); Belo Broad-
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cess to evidentiary recordings respond more adequately to the com-
peting interests that merit judicial recognition than do courts adopting 
the·mechanical approach that finds the presumption overcome by the 
possible existence of any conflicting constitutional interest. Nevertheless, 
failure to give the presumption of access a constitutional basis weakens 
the analysis of courts recognizing a strong presumption of access. 
1. Elevation of nonconstitutional interests above recognized con-
stitutional rights- Adoption of a strong presumption of access neglects 
the distinction between rights protected by the federal Constitution and 
privileges that derive from the common law tradition of American legal 
institutions. By acknowledging that the bases of the presumption are 
nonconstitutional yet allowing that presumption to counterbalance a 
defendanes right to a fair trial, courts effectively allow a common law 
privilege to exceed the recognized scope of the constitutional rights 
to which it is related. 
The theoretical incoherence is the result of a false starting-point of 
the legal analysis. Although the procedural issue is posed in terms of 
access, the true underlying conflict of interests stems from the pro-
spective public dissemination of information. It is only because courts 
cannot effectively prohibit the broadcast of evidentiary recordings after 
the news media have obtained copies of them39 that the issue is posed 
in terms of restricting the right of access or eliminating a right to copy 
from the scope of the right of access. 
2. Failure to consider adequately the independent interests of news 
media- Courts acknowledge that the presumption in favor of access 
effectuates values traditionally protected by the first amendment, 40 but 
they sometimes implement the presumption by considering whether the 
public has sufficient understanding of a judicial proceeding and whether 
broadcast of the evidentiary recordings is an "improper purpose. ,, 41 
Such an analysis does not recognize either the independent interest of 
the news media, the party actually seeking access, .or the unique role 
of the news media in effectuating first amendment interests. 
By determining whether the public has sufficient understanding of 
events, the courts elaborate impermissible limitations on the free com-
munication of information. In fact, it is only in the context of the 
casting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bolen, 8 Media L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1048, 1049 (S.D. Fla. 1981). 
39. Judicial use of prior restraints to prevent publication of information in the hands of 
the press is strictly limited by the Constitution. Cf. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 
435 U.S. 829 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
40. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
41. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); United States"v. Ed-
wards (In re Video-Indiana, Inc.), 672 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1982); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 
648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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_ competing interests of fair trial and free press that the level of public 
understanding assumes significance. Any increase of public understand-
ing is a recognized social value, and the sufficiency of public understand-
ing can be only a minimum acceptable- level, against which other in-
terests can be balanced. Courts should not, as the starting-point of 
their analysis, decide whether the increase in public understanding of 
an event that results from exposure to the evidentiary recordings is 
necessary. 
Such a paternalistic approach is objectionable as a matter of public 
policy. Moreover, judicial selection of information that is acceptable 
for broadcast directly interferes with the interest of the news media 
to gather and disseminate information, to make editorial judgments 
about the public presentation of information, 42 and to choose the form 
in which information will be communicated. 43 
3. Vagueness and irrelevance of factors considered in applying the 
presumption- Because the presumption in favor of access can be rebut-
ted by an improper purpose, courts consider not only the public in-
terest in dissemination of the information but also the integrity of the 
judicial system and the motives of the news media. 
_ The standards for determining improper purpose are subjective and 
vague. The doctrine may be applied beneficially to protect privacy in-
terests of individuals who appear in the recordings, yet improper pur-
pose may also be interpreted expansively to deny access to legitimately 
interested parties. Because the interests of the news media are not 
theoretically recognized in applying the presumption of access, they 
are either ignored or possibly considered improper. 
Moreover, considerations of purpose are irrelevant. It is not the 
motives for, but the consequences of, the broadcast of the evidentiary 
recordings that potentially affect the defendant's- right to a fair trial, 
the public's interest in being fully informed, and the judicial system's 
distinct interests in preserving its integrity. 
II. RECOGNIZING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF 
ACCESS To EVIDENTIARY RECORDINGS 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a state statute 
closing trials during the testimony of rape victims violated the con-
stitutional right of the public to attend criminal trials. 44 Notwithstand-
42. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
43. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 516 (1980) (plurality 
opinion). See generally Denniston, Right of Access: Birth of a Concept, 2 CAL. LAW., Nov. 1982; 
at 47; Note, A Foot in the Government's Door - Access Rights of the Press and Public: Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 12 U. ToL. L. REv. 991, 1006-26 (1981). 
44. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
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ing the availability of alternative sources of information regarding the 
substance of the testimony, the Court found rooted in the first amend-
ment the right of access by the press to criminal trials. 45 Despite a 
clear opportunity to limit the right of access to physical attendance, 46 
the opinion broadly interpreted the first amendment to include the ex-
ercise of rights "necessary to the enjoyment of other [established] First 
Amendment rights, " 47 and characterized the right of access to criminal 
trials as necessary to assure the effective exercise of free discussion 
of government fµnctions. 48 
The basic social interests requiring the recognition of a constitutional 
right of public access to criminal trials are the same interests that lead 
courts to adopt the presumption of access to evidentiary recordings: 
safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process by encouraging public 
scrutiny and protecting the informed participation of citizens in the 
government. 49 Moreover, the constitutional analysis adopted by the 
Court in recognizing the right of access by the public and press to 
criminal trials strongly suggests • that that right should be extended to 
embrace the right of the press to have access to evidentiary recordings 
in criminal trials for purposes of copying and broadcasting them. 
A. The Devitalization of Supreme Court Precedent 
Denying a Constitutional Right of Access 
The Supreme Court's denial of a constitutional basis for a right of 
access to evidentiary proceedings50 is of questionable authority after 
45. The Massachusetts trial court had ordered the exclusion of the press and public during 
the testimony of a minor rape victim, but the court did not deny the press access to the trial 
transcript, thus assuring that the press and public had "prompt and full access to all of the 
victim's testimony." Id. at 2625 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Nor was the press denied access to 
court personnel or other sources that provided an account of the testimony. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court held that the mandatory closure statute violated the first amendment right of 
access to criminal trials. Id. at 2622. 
46. The Court previously recognized only a constitutional right to attend crimiJial trials. Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558 (1980) (plurality opinion). Concurring 
opinions, however, elaborated a first amendment basis for a broader right of access to criminal 
trials. Id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 586-89 
(Brennan, J., concurring). In Globe Newspaper Co., the Court could have based its deci-
sion on the holding of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. without discussing the opinions of the con-
curring justices. 
47. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); see also Bridges 
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). 
48. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1982). 
49. Compare Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) (con-
stitutional right to attend trial) with United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (presumption of access to evidentiary recordings), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon 
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
50. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
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the Court's articulation of the constitutional right of access by the press 
to criminal trials. 
1. Unique fact situation confronted by the Court in prior case-
In confronting the issue of press access to evidentiary recordings for 
the first time, 51 the Court had faced a unique situation. Broadcasters 
sought access to audio recordings introduced as evidence during criminal 
prosecutions stemming from the Watergate scandal, and the source 
of the tapes raised difficult issues of executive privilege. The Court 
denied access to presidential tapes because recent federal legislation 
provided a more appropriate method for public access. 52 Because of 
the unique circumstances of the case, its general applicability to other 
cases was limited from the start. 53 
2. Subsequent erosion of underpinnings of the Court's sixth amend-
ment analysis- Several of the assumptions critical for the Court's denial 
of a constitutional right of access to evidentiary recordings have been 
subsequently eroded. For example, the Court rejected the sixth amend-
ment as a basis for press access to the evidentiary recordings. The Court 
reasoned that although public understanding remained incomplete 
without an opportunity to hear the recordings, public understanding 
remained similarly incomplete with respect to the testimony of witnesses, 
yet there was no constitutional right to have such testimony recorded 
and broadcast. 54 The Court's assumption unnecessarily expanded its 
prior limitation on press access. ss Moreover, subsequent cases have made 
clear that the Constitution requires no general oan on broadcast coverage 
of trials. 56 Indeed, it is no longer clear that there is no constitutional 
right to broadcast testimony of live witnesses. 57 Nor does the absence 
SI. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
52. See supra note I I. · 
53. Zimmerman, supra note I, at 652, suggests that the failure of any member of the Court 
to cite Nixon in the next case involving media use of communications technology to gather news, 
Houchkins v. KQED, 438 U.S. I (1978), supports the view of Nixon as a unique case. 
54. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978). 
55. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). In fact, the Court had established in earlier cases 
only that broadcast of judicial proceedings was impermissible when such broadcast deprived the 
defendant of a fair trial. See id. at 540-44. The logic of the precedent relied on by the Court 
was not applicable to the issue of access to evidentiary recordings, for virtually all the factors 
pertained to technical aspects of live broadcast of trials. Much of the Court's discussion of the 
potentially prejudicial impact of televising a trial focused on the disruption caused simply by 
the presence of the apparatus required for television. The Court was especially concerned that 
cameras might distract judges, witnesses, and jurors, and otherwise generally intrude upon the 
court proceedings. Id. at 544-51. The broadcast of evidentiary recordings copied out of court 
presents no such problems. 
56. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). Chandler did not decide whether a first 
amendment right of access to trials includes a right to broadcast trials, but at least one commen-
tator believes recognition of such a right is only a matter of time. See Ares, supra note 4, at 
175-77. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 1. 
57. Commentators have advocated recognition of a constitutional "technological right of 
access" which would mean a constitutional right to broadcast trials. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra 
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of a recognized constitutional right to broadcast trials negate a con-
stitutional right of access to evidentiary recordings for purposes of 
broadcast. On the contrary, live broadcast of a trial raises due process 
problems that are not presented by the broadcast of evidence that is 
copied out of court. 58 
3. Press participation is essential to the guarantee of a public trial-
In previously denying that press access to evidentiary recordings was 
constitutionally protected, the Supreme Court rejected the argument 
that the right to a public trial protected press access to evidentiary 
recordings. The Court denied the press's standing to assert this argu-
ment on the basis that the public trial guarantee was for the benefit 
of the defendant and conferred no special benefit on the press. Conse-
quently, the sixth amendment was satisfied by allowing part of the· 
public and press to attend a criminal trial. 59 But the Court has recently 
recognized that the press has a distinct first amendment interest in a 
public trial, and that press access promotes interests of both the public 
and the defendant. 60 
4. The scope of physical access of the press is not necessarily limited 
to that of the general public- In refusing to recognize a special right 
of the news media to have access to evidentiary recordings, the Supreme 
Court concluded that news media were seeking "physical accegs" to 
evidence that was greater than that to which the public was entitled; 
the Court held that the rights of the press with regard to judicial pro-
ceedings are no greater than the rights of the general public. 61 
note 1, at 654-65. Even without a constitutional requirement, 37 states now allow cameras in 
trial or appellate courts on some basis according to the Reporters's Committee for Freedom 
of the Press. See Cameras in Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1213, 1213 (1983). 
58. See supra note 55. In addition to the possible effect on trial participants noted in Estes, 
broadcast of trial proceedings exposes jurors and witnesses to publicity, which is troubling because 
they neither sought nor acted in such a manner prior to the trial as to attract such public atten-
tion. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
In contrast, the depiction of innocent third parties in evidentiary recordings is rare. Compare 
In re KSTP Television, 504 F. Supp. 360 (D. Minn. 1980) (activity involving a victim preceding 
a rape videotaped by the rapist) with United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting 
Co.), 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir.1981) (public official accepting a bribe filmed by hidden camera) 
and United States v. Bolen, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (activities of a money-
laundering service connected with a drug conspiracy). 
Similarly, allowing the videotaping of an entire trial may more readily result in the dissemina-
.tion of misleading or prejudicial information because an entire trial will likely be compressed 
into a two to three minute clip whereas an evidentiary recording will often not exceed two or 
three minutes. See generally Ares, supra note 4, at 177-82; Kamisar, Chandler v. Florida: What 
Can Be Said for a "Right of Access" to Televise Judicial Proceedings?, in 3 THE SUPREME COURT: 
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 149, 160-65 (1982). 
S9. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978). 
60. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 5S5, 566-18 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
61. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1978). Ironically, 
the Court has failed to make a similar distinction in its analysis of the common law presumption 
of access. 
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Nevertheless, although the general right of press access to judicial 
proceedings derives in part from the corresponding right of the public, 
the scope of the two need not be identical. On the contrary, precisely 
because press access is a crucial means of effectuating public access, 
the first amendment supports greater access for the news media than 
for individual citizens. 62 
5. The extent of 'physical access" is reduced by technological 
changes- By emphasizing the "physical access" necessary for the news 
media to reproduce evidentiary recordings, 63 the Court tacitly expressed 
concern about the inconvenience caused by the access. Although 
inconvenience is a legitimate concern, the "physical access" concept 
is artificial in the context of replicating evidentiary recordings. Copy-
ing of any public record is a recognized component of access64 and 
necessarily requires some sort of physical contact with or proximity 
to the record. In practice, the distinction between the physical access 
required for viewing, for photocopying, and for videotaping is insignifi-
cant. Moreover, any inconveniences will be reduced further as 
technological changes make recording techniques easier and faster. 
B. Underlying Constitutional Values Compelling 
Recognition of a Constitutional Right of 
Press Access to Evidentiary Recordings 
The underlying values the Court sought to promote by recognizing 
the right of the press to attend criminal trials similarly compel recogni-
tion of a constitutional right of press access to evidentiary recordings 
used in criminal trials. The establishment of the press's right of access 
62. Individual Justices of the Supreme Court have advocated recognition of an independent 
function for the press clause of the first amendment. See, e.g., Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960); Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); see also 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73, 577 n.12 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion) ("[P}eople now acquire [information about trials} chiefly through the print and electronic 
media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates for the public."); 
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. Criden 
(In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 1981). 
Because of the unique public interest function of the press, it is frequently provided with amenities 
not available to the general public such as a press room or press pass. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that preferential treatment of the press is appropriate. Thus, preferential seating 
for representatives of the media is proper when the courtroom is not large enough to accomodate 
all who wish to attend. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (1980) 
(plurality opinion); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
Justice Brennan, concurring in Richmond Newspapers, Inc., noted that as a practical matter 
the institutional press would often be the "fitting chief beneficiary of a right of access because 
[it] serves as the 'agent' of interested citizens and funnels information about trials to a large 
number of individuals." 448 U.S. at 586 n.2. 
63. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1978). 
64. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
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to the trial reflects the Court's acceptance of the fact that the public 
depends upon the press for information. 65 The press must be allowed 
to disseminate complete information about a trial in order for the public 
to be able to understand the trial most fully and to participate most 
effectively in the political system. Because "actual observation of 
testimony or exhibits contributes a dimension [of information] which 
cannot be fully provided by second-hand reports," 66 when aspects of 
actual observation can be reproduced by the broadcast of evidentiary 
recordings, such broadcast is desirable. 
Recordings used as evidence in criminal trials may be important to 
the eventual verdict. 67 Indeed, the use of evidentiary recordings at trial 
may be a highly controversial issue, especially if the defendant is a 
public official. 68 There may be several plausible interpretations of the 
events depicted in the recordings. For the public to be in the best posi-
tion to evaluate the facts and come to an informed opinion regarding 
the use of such evidence, it must experience the evidentiary recordings 
that are the actual subject of political and legal controversy. A mere 
description of the contents of such evidence no more satisfies the public's 
first amendment interests than does availability of alternative sources 
of information concerning the substance of a witness's testimony. 69 
C. Accommodating the Right of the Press to Recordings 
With Defendants' Right to a Fair Trial 
Recognition of a press right of access to evidentiary recordings need 
not conflict with the defendant's interest in a fair trial.10 Moreover, 
6S. See supra note 62. 
66. United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 824 (3d Cir. 1981). 
67. It is not yet clear what probative weight jurors give evidentiary recordings. See Raburn, 
Videotapes in Criminal Courts: Prosecutors on Camera, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 405, 425-26 (1981). 
Such recordings are, however, merely a more sophisticated variety of demonstrative evidence. 
See Heffernan, Effective Use of Demonstrative Evidence "Seeing is Believing", 5 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADvoc. 427, 430 (1982). Demonstrative evidence has an "immediacy and reality which endow 
it with particularly persuasive effect." McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OP nm LAW OP EVIDENCE 524-2S 
(E. Cleary 2d ed. i972). Consequently, the outcome of a trial will likely be significantly affected 
by the content of an evidentiary recording; see also German, Merin & Rolfe, Videotape Evidence 
at Trial, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 209, 229 (1982). Nevenheless, the actual trial of a case in which 
evidentiary recordings play a major role "presents the same challenge as a case with any other 
form of evidence." Sear, How to Try a Tape Case, LmGATION, Fall 1982, at 28-30. 
68. See United States v. Criden (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d 
Cir. 1981). See generally Tigar, Crime on Camera, LmGATION, Fall 1982, at 24. The propriety 
of law enforcement use of cenain tactics may well be at issue. To some, the circumstances in 
which the evidentiary recording was made may seem "contrived and the scene too carefully ar-
ranged to resolve ambiguities in the government's favor." Id. at 2S. To others, the same re-
corded material may show a defendant eager to violate the law. 
69. CJ. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Coun, 4S7 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982). 
70. The defendant may not object to the use of evidentiary recordings by the press and might 
even join the news media's motion for access. In a case already highly publicized, broadcast 
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in most cases where there is potential conflict, the news media's right 
can be accommodated with the defendant's right to a fair trial. As 
a last resort, access should be limited if necessary to protect the defend-
ant's right; but the press should be denied access only if a defendant 
can demonstrate that his right to a fair trial cannot be protected by 
less restrictive means. Any denial of access should be "narrowly 
tailored."11 
1. The prejudicial effect of broadcast publicity on jurors compared 
with the effect of other kinds of publicity- Jurors can be prejudiced 
by exposure to evidentiary recordings or any other evidence outside 
the courtroom. 12 Some have argued that exposure to evidentiary record-
ings presents a greater danger of prejudice than other forms of evidence 
because broadcast media coverage has a greater psychological impact 
on viewers. 73 Nevertheless, it has not been established that broadcast 
information has a greater effect than any other form of 
communication;74 in fact, some empirical studies suggest that the public 
of evidentiary recordings will increase the level of publicity only incrementally and will be un-
likely to have any appreciable additional prejudicial effect. See United States v. Criden (In re 
National Broadcasting Co.), 648 F.2d 814, 825 (3d Cir. 1981). BuJ see United States v. Bolen, 
8·Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1981). Furthermore, in many cases in which recordings 
are used as evidence, the defendant does not deny that the recorded events occurred and relies 
instead on a legal defense such as entrapment. See, e.g., United States v. Jenrette (In re National 
Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 009 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In such cases, broadcast of the evidence would 
· not as directly prejudice the defendant's case as cases where the content of the recordings is 
controverted or cases where radically different interpretations are placed on the recorded events. 
11. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 451 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). 
72. All evidence presented to the jury out of court is potentially prejudicial. Repetition alone 
may enhance the effect of the evidence. The federal rules allow the exclusion of even relevant 
evidence if its value is outweighed by "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. 
Evm. 403. Moreover, prejudicial evidence is frequently admitted, when relevant, because courts 
can control the prejudicial effects through limiting instructions. Indeed, in deciding whether to 
admit evidence, courts consider the probable effectiveness of such instructions. See FED. R. Evm. 
403 advisory committee note. The prejudicial effects of such evidence may be aggravated if jurors 
are exposed to it again but without any limiting instructions. 
Exposing jurors to evidentiary recordings out of court may present special problems. For ex-
ample, it has been suggested that tapes might be edited to highlight the most incriminating por-
tions with no opportunity for the defendant to bring forward his or her explanation or otherwise 
place the recordings in context. See Estes v .. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 514 (1965) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring); United States v. Jenrette (In re National Broadcasting Co.), 653 F.2d 609, 616 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981); Note, Copying and Broadcasting, supra note IS, at 575 n.159. But see Chandler 
v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 580-81 (1981). 
13. See generally Note, Copying and Broadcasting, supra note 15, at 567 n.102, 515. 
14. See Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 681; see also Wrightsman, The American Trial Jury 
on Trial: Empirical Evidence and Procedural Modlf,cations, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1978, at 137, 
145. Despite the broadcast media's attempts to depict events dramatically, jurors are not necessarily 
prejudiced by exposure to televised publicity. See Hoiberg & Stires, The Effect of Several Types 
of Pretrial Publicity on the Guilt Attributions of Simulafed Jurors, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PYscHoLOGY 
267, 274 (1973). The danger of prejudicial publicity arises from the capacity of the press to 
create a general public perception of guilt or innocence prior to trial. But there is no reason 
to believe the broadcast media is any more irreponsible than the print media. See Barber, The 
Problem of Prejudice: A New Approach to Assessing the Impact of Courtroom Cameras, 66 
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believes television news is biased. 75 
Moreover, the broadcast of recordings could actually diminish the 
possibility of prejudicial publicity in some cases by making re-enact-
ments, with their attendant risks of misinterpretation, unnecessary. 16 
Broadcast of evidentiary recordings might also corroborate an entrap-
ment defense.77 Consequently, to the extent that broadcast of the recor-
dings has the potential for prejudicing jurors, there is no reason to 
believe that the danger of prejudice is qualitatively different from that 
presented by other forms of publicized evidence. 
2. Methods of limiting adverse effects of broadcast publicity- The 
potential prejudicial effect of broadcast evidentiary recordings can be 
limited in a number of ways. 
a. Instructions to the jury- The adverse prejudicial effect of publi-
city is minimized in part by the jurors' confidence in their superior 
understanding of the case. 78 Moreover, jurors can be instructed to avoid 
all news coverage of the trial. 7.9 If the trial or parts of the evidence 
are broadcast, jurors can be specifically admonished not to watch 
television. 80 Empirical research81 indicates that jurors do obey instruc-
tions not to expose themselves to news coverage about the case. 
b. Other measures of jury control limiting the adverse effect of 
broadcast of evidence- If the broadcast of evidentary recordings 
presents a real danger of prejudicing the jury or makes it impossible 
to select an impartial jury, traditional means of countering the adverse 
effects of the broadcast can be as effective as denial of access to the record-
Jun1CATURE 248, 25S (1983) (attributing prejudice not to media exposure but to nature of the 
trial process). 
15. See G. COMSTOCK, TELEVISION IN AMERICA 50 (1980); SCHOLARLY REsoURCES, INC., THE 
GALLUP Pou: PUBLIC OPINION 1979, at 157-60 (1980). But see THE ROPER ORGAN1ZATION, INC., 
EVOLVING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TEI.EvlsION AND OTHER MAss MEDIA 1959-1980, at 3 (1980) 
(majority of the public thinks news and information programs on television present a balanced 
view). 
16. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1262 n.4S (1976), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 43S U.S. 589 (1978). 
11. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972). 
78. See Kaplan, 0/ Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REv. 621, 623 (1977). 
19. See United States v. Mouzin, 9 MEDIAL. REP. (BNA) 13S7, 1361 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 
1983); Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 682. 
80. The exposure of witnesses to trial proceedings presents similar problems. In at least one 
. case a conviction has been appealed in part because of the exposure of a witness to televised 
proceedings prior to testimony. The judge said, "This is something we didn't anticipate. But 
it was not really different than a witness reading a newspaper before he testifies. In the future 
we will probably make all witnesses sign a statement saying they will not watch television before 
they testify." Cameras in Court, supra note S7, at 1213. 
81. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). See generally Bridgeman & 
Marlowe, Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Study Based on Actual Felony Trials, 64 J. AP· 
PLIED PSYCHOLOGY 91, 98 (1979); Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom 
and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REv. 431, 448-S0 (1977); Simon, Does the Court's Deci-
sion in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News 
Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. SIS (1977). 
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ings. Trial courts have considerable experience in the use of voir dire 
examinations, continuances, changes of venue, and sequestrations as 
methods to counter the effects of prejudicial publicity. 82 Although the 
effectiveness of some of these measures has been challenged, 83 there 
is no reason to believe these measures are less successful in countering 
prejudice resulting from broadcast publicity than prejudice from other 
forms of publicity.84 
c. Acceptable levels of juror exposure to prejudicial information 
as comparable irrespective of communication medium- The obvious 
technical differences between broadcast and print publicity do not justify 
a stricter standard for determining acceptable levels of juror exposure 
to potentially prejudicial information when that information is 
broadcast. 85 The goal of a perfect, impartial jury is continuously com-
promised by our country's firm commitment to a vigorous public discus-
sion of the operation of the judicial system. As a result of these com-
peting values, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Con-
82. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966) (discussing ways to minimize the 
effects of publicity on a jury). Courts prefer to screen out prejudiced veniremen, and extensive 
voir dire examination can be an effective way to counter extensive prejudicial publicity. See 
Padawer-Singer, Singer & Singer, Voir Dire by Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, 57 
JUDICATURE 386, 391 (1974). 
83. See Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An Opportunity for Coexistence, 29 STAN. L. 
REv. 561, 562-66 (1977). Continuances and changes of venue have sometimes been challenged 
as violating the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971). 
But see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (delay often works to the defendant's advantage 
and whether fair trial rights are violated depends on the particular facts of the case). 
The lilnited empirical research in this area is in conflict and methodologically deficient in several 
respects. See generally Schmidt, supra note 81, at 444-49 (1977); Simon, supra note 81; Wrightsman, 
supra note 74. The most serious shortcoming of virtually all empirical research in this area is 
that the structure of the jury system for the most part prevents research on real juries; thus 
research relies on simulations. Simulated juries differ significantly from real juries; simulation 
cannot reproduce the "sense of solemn responsibility that undoubtedly has a powerful impact 
on real jurors' subjectivity, conformity to group behavior and serious commitment to established 
norms." Moreover, simulations are usually shorter than trials and so do not permit the diffusion 
of the effect of exposure to publicity that naturally occurs over a longer period of time. See 
Schmidt, supra note 81, at 448. Consequently, simulated studies will probably tend to exaggerate 
the effect of prejudicial publicity on juror behavior. 
84. Almost all studies have focused on print publicity and have considered broadcast pub-
licity, if at all, only in the context of narrative accounts of news events. Nevertheless the conclu-
sions regarding the effect of print publicity are probably equally applicable to broadcast pub-
licity. Because there is no reason to believe that broadcast coverage is inherently more damaging 
than print coverage, the effectiveness of curative measures for both is comparable. See generally 
Barber, supra note 74, at 255; Wrightsman, supra note 74, at 145; Zimmerman, supra note 1, 
at 681; Note, From Estes to Chandler: The Distinction Between Television and Newspaper 
Coverage, 3 CoMM/ENT L.J. 503 (1981). 
85. Cf. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 575 (1981) ("[t]he risk of juror prejudice in some 
cases does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the printed media; so also 
the risk of such prejudice does not warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast 
coverage"). 
FALL 1983] Media Access to Evidentiary Recordings 137 
stitution does not require flawless trials, 86 and that jurors need not 
be completely ignorant of all facts relating to a case as long as they 
are able to suspend their impressions or opinions and reach a verdict 
based on the evidence presented at trial. 87 Appellate courts reviewing 
claims of jury prejudice consider the "totality of circumstances" in 
determining whether the defendant was denied a fair trial. 88 Courts 
recognize that trials can meet constitutional standards despite widespread 
hostile publicity. 89 This tolerance for the exposure of jurors to poten-
tially prejudicial information should similarly be extended to the broad-
cast of evidentiary recordings. 
3. Delay of access until after trial as unacceptable prohibition of 
access- Postponing release of evidentiary recordings until after the 
possibility for prejudice has passed in an effort to minimize the poten-
tial adverse effects of the broadcast of evidentiary recordings effec-
tively prohibits access. Such a postponement would be justified only 
in the extreme case where access must be denied as the only way of 
protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial. Any indefinite postpone-
ment justified by a continuing possibility of prejudice should be un-
constitutional; such a restraint of publication is not acceptable in the 
context of the print media90 and should not be allowed in the context 
of the broadcast media. 
-4. Standards governing closure of criminal trials and prior restraints 
as applicable to prohibitions on news media access to or broadcast 
of recordings admitted in evidence- Because access to evidentiary 
recordings is a correlative right of the recognized right of public access 
to criminal trials,91 the standards for denying access to the recordings 
after they have been introduced as evidence should be the same as the 
standards for closing the criminal trial to the public. 
86. It is enough that a defendant's rights are "scrupulously respected." McGautha v. California, 
402 U.S. 183, 221 (1971); accord Vines v. Muncy, 553 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 8S1 (1981). 
87. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); 
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). To require total ignorance "[i]n these days of swift, widespread 
and diverse methods of communication" would be to establish "an impossible standard." Id. 
at 722-23. 
88. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (197S); accord United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315 
(10th Cir.) (affirming conviction where a prosecutor released copies of videotaped encounters 
between the defendant and FBI undercover agents without trial court acquiescence and selected 
portions were broadcast during the pendency of the trial), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979). 
89. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 56S (1976); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
S32, 561-62 (196S). Compare Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (conviction struck 
down due to "carnival atmosphere" of trial proceedings) with United States ex rel. Darcy v. 
Handy, 3S1 U.S. 4S4, 463 (19S6) (conviction upheld against a claim of prejudicial publicity because 
trial was conducted in a "calm judicial manner"). Prejudice of "constitutional dimensions" 
must be demonstrated. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 581-82 (1981). 
90. See infra note 94. 
91. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
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The circumstances in which closure of a criminal trial is permissible 
are extremely limited. 92 A useful test requires that a def end ant seeking 
closure establish that it is "strictly and inescapably necessary in order 
to protect the fair-trial guarantee. " 93 
In prohibiting news media broadcast of evidentiary recordings of 
which the news media have obtained copies, courts should be governed 
by the severe restrictions that limit the imposition of prior restraints. 94 
In determining whether a restraining order is an appropriate solution 
to a problem of pretrial publicity, a court must consider the extent 
of pretrial news coverage, whether other measures could mitigate the 
effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity, and the effectiveness of a 
restraining order in the particular instance before the court. 95 Only if 
the defendant's right to a fair trial cannot be protected by less restric-
tive means is such a restraint allowable. 
CONCLUSION 
The right of the press to obtain access to evidentiary recordings used 
in criminal trials requires constitutional protection. The common law 
presumption of access currently employed by the courts does not give 
adequate weight to the first amendment values underlying the presump-
tion. Recognition of a constitutional right of access better allows the 
press and public to fulfill their roles as guardians of the judicial system. 
A constitutional right of press access can be accommodated with 
a defendant's right to a fair trial in many cases. Courts should deny 
news media access to evidentiary recordings only when there are no 
92. The Supreme Court has not specifically elaborated acceptable criteria for closing criminal 
trials, but the Court has stated that where access to a criminal trial is denied to inhibit disclosure 
of sensitive infonnation, the denial must be "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest" 
and "narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 
S. Ct. 2613, 2620 (1982) (dicta); see also United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th 
Cir. 1982). Prior to Globe Newspapers, the Court had indicated that a criminal trial must remain 
open in the absence of an "overriding interest articulated in the findings." Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980). Neither decision elaborated the nature of the counter-
vailing interest necessary to justify closure. 
93. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 440 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). At a minimum, the defendant should show that there is "a substantial 
probability that irreparable damage to his fair-trial right will result from conducting the pro-
ceeding in public," that there is a "substantial probability that alternatives to closure will not 
protect adequately his right to a fair trial," and that there is "a substantial probability that 
closure will be effective in protecting against the perceived harm." Id. at 441--42. 
94. The Court characterizes prior restraints as "the most serious and least tolerable infringe-
ment[s] on First Amendment rights," justified only in unusual cases. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-62 (1976); see also supra note 9. 
95. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976). The concurring opinion 
erected an even higher burden of proof. See id. at 570-71 (White, J., concurring); see also id. 
at 571-72 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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effective alternative means to protect the defendant's right to a fair 
trial. A denial of access should be justified by the same high burden 
of proof currently imposed ori those seeking closure of a criminal trial 
or a prior restraint on publication. 
-Teri G. Rasmussen 

